Capital Defense Journal
Volume 9

Issue 1

Article 7

Fall 9-1-1996

FELKER v. TURPIN 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996) United States Supreme
Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons

Recommended Citation
FELKER v. TURPIN 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996) United States Supreme Court, 9 Cap. DEF J. 15 (1996).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol9/iss1/7

This Casenote, U.S. Supreme Ct. is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital
Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

CapitalDefense Journal,Vol. 9, No. 1 - Page 15

M. Impact in Virginia
Because of the imposition of the new federal habeasrules under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,3 1 it is not clear what
impact, ifany, this decision will have on habeascases litigated under the
new regime. The Act puts such strict time limits on the filing of habeas

31 Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
32 For an in-depth discussion of the ramifications of the new law,
see Raymond, The IncredibleShrinking Writ:HabeasCorpusUnderthe

corpuspetitions that future petitioners will almost certainly be unable to
replicate the actions of Lonchar. 32 The holding of the case may prove
useful, however, to counsel who, in other contexts, are facing the
dismissal of their case on supposedly "equitable" grounds.
Summary and analysis by:
Daryl L. Rice

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.

FELKER v. TURPIN
116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On November 23, 1981, Ellis Wayne Felker met Joy Ludlam, a
cocktail waitress. He induced her to visit him the next day by offering her
a job at a business he claimed to own. Ms. Ludlam was found dead in a
creek some two weeks later. The medical examiner reported she had been
beaten, raped, sodomized, and then strangled. Hair and other incriminating fiber evidence linked the victim to Felker. In addition, a witness
placed the victim's car at Felker's home the day she disappeared. 1
Felker, who was on parole for rape at the time of the murder, was
convicted of capital murder, rape, aggravated sodomy, and false imprisonment and was sentenced to death on the capital murder charge. His
conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the
Supreme Court of Georgia, 2 and the United States Supreme Court denied
his petition for certiorari.3 The state trial court denied collateral relief,
the Supreme Court of Georgia refused to issue a certificate of probable
cause to appeal the denial, and the United States Supreme Court again
4
denied certiorari.
Felker then filed his first federal habeas petition, alleging five
substantive claims, 5 but the district court denied the petition and the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial. 6 Felker then filed
a second state petition a few days before his scheduled execution, which
was denied. On May 2,1996, the week of his scheduled execution, Felker
filed for a stay of execution and a motion for leave to file a second federal
habeaspetition. He sought to raise two new claims: the first that the voir

1 Felker v. State, 314 S.E.2d 621, 627-628 (Ga. 1984).
2 Id. at 649.
3 Felker v. Georgia, 469 U.S. 873 (1984).
4 Felker v. Zant, 502 U.S. 1064 (1992).
5 Felker's claims were: (1) that the state's evidence was insufficient
to convict him; (2) that the state withheld exculpatory evidence; (3) that
there was ineffective assistance ofcounsel at sentencing; (4) that the state
improperly used hypnosis to refresh a witness' memory; and (5) that the
state violated the double jeopardy clause by using Felker's 1976 conviction as evidence at trial. Felkerv. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2336 (1996).

dire and jury instructions had been constitutionally invalid, and the
second that new forensic evidence "so discredited the State's testimony
at trial that petitioner had a colorable claim of factual innocence." 7
Between Felker's first and second federal habeas petitions the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (ATEDA) 8 had
been signed into law. The court of appeals thereafter held that Felker's
second petition did not meet the requirements of the Act, nor would it
have met pre-Act requirements. The court of appeals therefore denied
both motions. 9 Felker then filed what he styled a "Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, for Appellate or Certiorari Review of the Decision ofthe
United States Circuit Court for the Eleventh Circuit, and for Stay of
Execution." 10 The Supreme Court granted the stay and certiorari,
limiting briefing to three issues: (1) the extent to which the provisions of
ATEDA apply to an original petition for habeas corpus filed in the
Supreme Court, (2) whether application of ATEDA suspended the writ
of habeas corpus in this case, and (3) whether Title I of ATEDA,
especially § 106(b)(3)(E), constitutes an unconstitutional restriction on
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 11
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court held, first, that although Title I
does impose new restrictions on the Supreme Court's authority to grant
relief, it did not repeal their authority to entertain original habeas
petitions. 12 Second, the Court held that Section 106(b)'s "gatekeeping"

6 Felker v. Thomas, 52 F.3d 907 (1995).
7 Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. at 2337.
8 Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244,
2253-54,2261-66).
9 Felker v. Turpin, 83 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 1996).
10 Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. at 2337.
11 Id.
12 Id.
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function applies only to those petitions filed in district court. Third, the
Court held that the writ had not been suspended in violation of the U.S.
Constitution, Article I, § 9, clause 2,14 and fourth, that, applying the new
law to Felker, his petition did not warrant relief. 15 The petition for an
the petition for
original writ of habeas corpus was denied, while
16
certiorariwas dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
ANALYSIS/ APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I.

ATEDA

This case was the first to discuss the new habeascorpus restrictions
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(ATEDA). 17 Consequently, a brief overview of the provisions of the Act
18
implicated in this case is necessary to its understanding: Subsections
106(b)(1) and (b)(2) apply to the dismissal of second or successive
petitions, such as Felker's, while subsection 106(b)(3) serves a
"gatekeeping" function. 19 In order to file a second or successive petition
in district court, the petitioner must first convince a three-judge panel
of the courtof appeals (the "gatekeepers") thathis petitionmakes aprima
facie showing ofcompliance with subsections 106(b)(1) and (b)(2). If the

13 Id. at 2339.
14
Id. at 2340. The Constitution provides that "[t]he Privilege ofthe
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. Const. Art.
I, § 9, cl. 2.
15 Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2340.
16 Id. at 2341.
17 Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244,
2253-54,2261-66).
18 For an in-depth look at ATEDA and its implications, see
Raymond, The Incredible Shrinking Writ: Habeas Corpus Under The
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Capital Defense Jourhal, this issue.
19 Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2337. Subsection 106(b)(1), (b)(2) and
(b)(3) amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) to read:
(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus
application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior
application shall be dismissed.
(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus
application under section 2254 that was notpresented in a prior
application shall be dismissed unless(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule
of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable; or
(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have
been discoveredpreviously through the exercise ofdue
diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense.
(3) (A) B efore a second or successive application permitted by
this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall
move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order
authorizing the district court to consider the application.
(B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order authoriz-

motion for leave is denied at this stage, it is not appealable to any court,
including the Supreme Court. Should the motion be granted, the petitioner may then file his habeaspetition in district court, which will again
scrutinize it for compliance with 106(b)(1) and (b)(2) before looking to
the substantive claims.
Subsection 106(b)(1) states that a claim that was presented in a prior
application must be dismissed. Subsection (b)(2), on the other hand,
provides that a new claim must either (A) rely "on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court,20 that was previously unavailable" or (B) present
evidence of factual innocence21 which could not have been discovered
previously by the exercise of due diligence. It should be remembered that
this is the standard just to avoid dismissal, not to succeed on the actual
claim.
II.

ATEDA Does Not Preclude the Filing of an Original Writ

The Court first turned to the question of whether ATEDA precluded
22
the Court from considering an original writ of habeas corpus. The
Court found the question was controlled by a Reconstruction-era case, Ex
parte Yerger.23 In Yerger, Congress had revoked the appellate jurisdic-

ing the district court to consider a second or successive
application shall be determined by a three-judge panel of
the court of appeals.
(C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a
second or successive application only if it determines that
the application makes a prima facie showing that the
application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.
(D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the authorization to file a second or successive application not later than
30 days after the filing of the motion.
(E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of
appeals to file a second or successive application shall not
be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for
rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.
20 The Court left undecided a number of issues implicit in the text
of 106(b)(1) and (2). Subsection (b)(2)(A), for example, is an obvious
reference to the retroactivity doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989). See also the case summary of O'Dell v. Netherland, Capital
Defense Journal, this issue.
What if the applicant shows that the claim does not rely on a new
rule? It is often unclear whether a case is a new rule or merely a
reinterpretation of an old rule. Indeed, what if the new claim relied upon
has been held, after the first petition, not to be a new rule by the United
States Supreme Court? These and other issues raised by the sloppy
drafting of ATEDA may provide counsel with access to federal court.
Expert assistance on these matters is available from the Virginia Capital
Resource Center in Richmond, Virginia.
21 Another undecided question is whether this language eliminates
the "innocent of the death penalty" grounds for appeal, which had
previously been approved as a basis permitting a successive petition.
Under this defense, relief will be granted if the defendant can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error,
no reasonable juror would have found him eligible for the death penalty.
See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
22 As opposed to the appellate review of a second petition, which
could be foreclosed by the "gatekeeper" provision of the Act, subsection
106(b)(3). (But see discussion of concurring opinions, infra).
23 75 U.S. 85 (1869).
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tion of the Court to consider certain state habeaspetitions. The Yerger
court declined to find by implication that Congress had revoked the
Court's power to entertain original habeaspetitions. Likewise, the Court
in Felker could find no mention in the Act of the Supreme Court's
authority to entertain original petitions; therefore it declined to find the
power repealed by implication. 24
The Court then proceeded to delineate which parts of subsection
106 applied to original petitions for habeas filed in the Supreme Court.
Because the language of 106(b)(3), the "gatekeeping" provision, specifies that it applies only to applications "in the district court," the Court
reasoned that the gatekeeping provision would not apply to original
petitions. "There is no such limitation, however, on the restrictions on
repetitive and new claims imposed by subsections 106(b)(1) and (2)."25
The Court declined to rule, however, on whether it was bound by these
provisions, sayiig only that "they certainly inform our consideration of
original habeas petitions." 26 Thus, it appears likely that the Supreme
Court will apply the 106(b)(1) and (2) restrictions to writs filed with the
Court as original petitions.
The Court also addressed the issue ofwhether ATEDA deprived the
Court of appellate jurisdiction in violation of Article III, § 2 of the
Constitution. That section provides that, except for those few areas in
which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, it shall have "[i]n all
other Cases ...appellate Jurisdiction." 27 The Court recognized that the
gatekeeping provisions of the Act did indeed diminish the Court's
appellate jurisdiction, but found that Congress had the right to do so
under the very language ofArticle III, § 2: "the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction... with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
Although the retention by the Supreme Court of the power to grant
original habeaspetitions salvages some remnants ofthe writ, the requirements for actually being granted review are so difficult to meet that the
victory for petitioners may prove to be a hollow one.
IH. The Act Does Not Suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The Constitution provides that "[tjhe Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended."' 28 Felker argued that the provisions of the Act effectively suspended the writ. The Court disagreed.
The Court first pointed out that the writ historically was much more
restricted in scope than it has been in the latter half of this century. The
Court then opined that the "gatekeeping" requirement "simply transfers
from the district court to the court of appeals a screening function" which
already existed. 2 9 As for the restrictions on successive petitions in
106(b)(1) and (2), the Court characterized them as within the scope of the
evolving "abuse of the writ" doctrine, and therefore not a suspension of
the writ. The Court did not explain exactly why being within the scope
of an evolving statutory doctrine prevented a statute from violating the
United States Constitution. The driving force, however, seems to be
deference to Congress: "we have long recognized that.., judgments
' 30
about the proper scope of the writ are normally for Congress to make.
Further, having decided that its original jurisdiction was untouched by
the Act, and having recognized the Article III power of Congress to

restrict its appellate jurisdiction, the Court's conclusion that the writ was
not suspended was not surprising.
IV. Grant of an Original Writ Only in Exceptional
Circumstances
The Court quickly dispensed with Felker's claims, despite the fact
that he was claiming that new evidence would prove his factual innocence. The Court quoted Supreme Court Rule 20.4(a), which reads in
part, "To justify the granting of a writ of habeascorpus, the petitioner
must show exceptional circumstances warranting the exercise of the
Court's discretionary powers and must show that adequate relief cannot
be obtained in any other form or from any other court. These writs are
rarely granted." Without going into any analysis of Felker's claims, the
Courtruled thathehad notmet these requirements and denied his petition
for an original writ.
This does not bode well for future petitioners to the Court via
original writs. Felker's claim of factual innocence seems to at least
arguably fulfill the requirements for a successive petition under subsection 106(b)(2)(B) of the Act, yet did not even warrant a cursory review
of its merits by the Court. One wonders if any petitioner will be able to
show "exceptional circumstances" sufficient to move the Court to a
serious review of his claim.
V.

The Concurrences

There were two three-justice concurrences in this case, one written
by Justice Stevens, the other by Justice Souter. Each contains some hints
that there might be a way to circumvent the "gatekeeping" provisions of
the Act in an appropriate case.
First, Justice Stevens,joined by Justices S outer and Breyer, argued
that pursuant to its power of interlocutory review, the Supreme Court
could review proposed dispositions referred to them by a court of
appeals. Second, according to Stevens, the Supreme Court retains
jurisdiction to directly review gatekeeping orders pursuant to the All
Writs Act.31 Finally, he argued that the retention of the original writ gives
'32
the Court "the functional equivalent of direct review."
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer, recited
a similar list of possible exercises of appellate jurisdiction, then suggested that just because the Act does not violate the Exceptions Clause
on its face or in this application, does not foreclose the possibility that it
might be found unconstitutional in other circumstances. Justice Souter
thought that "[t]he question could arise if the Courts of Appeals adopted
' 33
divergent interpretations of the gatekeeper standard.
Although the concurrences only offer a glimmer of hope for
appellate review, these opportunities should be exploited in the proper
circumstances, such as if the Circuits adopt widely divergent standards
in implementing section 106. Felker is only the beginning of litigation
over the restrictive provisions of ATEDA. Attorneys seeking postconviction relief must stay abreast of developments as they unfold.

Summary and analysis by:
Daryl L. Rice

24 Felker, 116 S.Ct. at 2337.
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id. at 2339.
Id.
U.S. Const. art. HI, § 2.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
Felker, 116 S.Ct. at 2340.
Id. (citations omitted).

31 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651. The All Writs Act reads in part: "The
Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C.A. §
1651(a).
32 Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2341.
33 Id. at 2342.

